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Abstract
This paper assesses Revolutionary and Napoleonic wartime economic policy.
Suspension of gold convertibility in 1797 allowed the Bank of England to nurture
British monetary orthodoxy. The Order of the Privy Council suspended gold
payments on Bank of England notes and a¤orded simultaneous protection to the
government and the Bank in pursuit of the conicting goals of price stability and
war nance. The government, the Bank of England and the commercial banks
formed a loose alliance drawing on due political and legal processes and also paid
close attention to public opinion. We suggest that the ongoing solvency of the
Bank of England was facilitated by suspension and allowed the Bank to continue to
make substantial prots throughout the Wars. It became acceptable for merchants
to continue to trade with non-convertible Bank of England notes and for the
government to nance the war e¤ort, even with signicant recourse to unfunded
debt. These aspects combined to create a suspension of convertibility that did
not undermine the currency. By contrast, the Assignats debacle had cost the
French monetary system its reputation in the last decade of the 18th century and
so Napoleonic nance had to evolve within a more rigid and limiting framework.
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1 Introduction
The Order of the Kings Privy Council, dated Sunday, 26 February 1797, marked a
revolutionarydevelopment in English monetary management: the monetary regime 
the gold standard was suspended and an untested policy of inconvertible paper currency
adopted. By declaring that it is indispensably necessary for the public service that the
Directors of the Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash until the sense of the
Parliament can be taken on that subject,1 the Council prevented bearers of Bank of
Englands notes from conversion into gold (cash) and, consequently, an exhaustion of the
Banks gold reserves in the face of a wartime banking panic. From its establishment in
1694 until 1797, the Bank of England had basically followed the gold standard rule by
maintaining the value of its note issue in terms of a xed weight of gold, and to a lesser
extent silver, by buying and selling these metals at a xed price on demand.2 Yet, in the
absence of gold payments each note simply carried a mere promise of convertibility on
some future unknown date. In this paper, therefore, we seek to try and understand why
this form of promise was acceptable and why such a promise was not a feasible strategy
for the French state.
The Bank of Englands decision to seek political approval for a temporary cessation
in the convertibility of paper money to gold in 1797 led to an important paper money
experiment.3 In principle, the absence of the gold convertibility rule would have given the
Bank of England an opportunity to conduct inationary war nance during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, but when compared to similar experiments in France
earlier in the eighteenth century or later war-time hyperinations in the twentieth century,
the suspension did not lead to rampant ination or a collapse in the circulation of paper
currency. The Bank Restriction Period, or the Suspension Period as it subsequently
came to be known, lasted much longer than the Bank or the government had probably
anticipated. As the war dragged on  the French Revolutionary Wars turned into the
Napoleonic Wars it became clear that resumption of the gold standard would not be
possible until, at least, the hostilities had ceased. On 1 May 1821, almost six years after
the Battle of Waterloo, which had nally brought the war to an end, the gold standard
was resumed at the pre-war par value.
The original narrative of the Restriction Period considers it as a simple straightforward
emergency measure to prevent the Bank of Englands gold reserves from vanishing.4 In
some studies, on the other hand, the suspension has been seen as inationary policy that
helped to increase either the Banks proprietors private prots5 or the governments
seigniorage revenue.6 This approach, in our opinion, is a somewhat oversimplied
interpretation of wartime economic policy. In this paper we study the extent to which the
decision to suspend temporarily gold payments by the Bank of England and to adopt a co-
1The Times 28 February 1797.
2There had been two minor suspensions in 169697 during the Great Recoinage and in 1745, as a
result of the Jacobite invasion. We thank François Velde for bringing these to our attention.
3For an outline of the theoretical and early empirical literature, see for example Perlman (1986) and
Viner (1937).
4See Gilbart, 1834, for example.
5See Ricardo (1811) and Andréadès (1909).
6See Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Redish (1993).
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ordinated strategy of gradual resumption can be thought of as a monetary policy, which
a¤orded protection to the government and its central bank in pursuing the conicting goals
of price stability and war nance. We argue that the decision to suspend the payments
was not made arbitrarily by the Bank of England but in close collaboration with Prime
Minister Pitt (the Younger), Parliament, the Treasury, the Crown and the London Money
Markets, which allowed the existing means of payment to continue to circulate rather than
jeopardising its existence.
We abstract somewhat from the practical debates in Parliament, the popular press
and in the City, which became known as the Bullionist Controversy, and provided the
focus for much subsequent monetary analysis of the period. These debates have evoked
great interest amongst distinguished scholars such as Horseeld (1949), Fetter (1959) and
Perlman (1986). By contrast, we approach the suspension from the viewpoint of monetary
and banking theory and interpret the actions of the Bank of England through a number of
stylized models on balance sheet management. (i) optimal gold reserve holdings; (ii) asset
liability management; and (iii) the importance of stabilising the publics expectations
about the future price level under a quasi-gold standard. These models suggest that
instead of merely being an emergency measure, the suspension in February 1797 was an
appropriate policy response, given the types of shocks that had hit the economy. This is
because by suspending the payment of gold on its liabilities until a lasting peace, the Bank
of England was able to align the duration of its liabilities and assets more accurately,
it could also provide war nance by allowing some leverage in its loans relative to its
market value, without ipso facto threatening the monetary stock of gold, and so lend for
(marginal) unfunded government expenditures. As the suspension allowed the Bank of
England to remain protable it was then also a way of ensuring that Bank of England
liabilities were likely to be valuable in the future and, therefore, held and used as a means
of payment by merchants.
The success of the suspension alone was unlikely to have been su¢ cient to placate
markets and ensure long-run stability as maintaining the value of inconvertible paper
currency during the French Wars was not a trivial task. The suspension was also not
a minor deviation from the gold standard rule, rather it became a monetary regime of
its own right that lasted for 24 years. By the 1820s a generation of British merchants
and bankers had sold and bought, borrowed and lent without ever having had rst-hand
experience of convertible currency. Bordo and Kydland (1995) suggested that the gold
standard ought to be thought of as contingent rule but instead of necessarily thinking of
suspension as credible, we ask how authorities - through a number of devices - were able
to maintain the credibility of the future resumption during these turbulent years.7
At the point of suspension the duration of the war was, naturally, unknown and so
monetary policy decision makers had to have a contingency plan that dealt with the
7The extensive empirical surveys by Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997),
consisting of over 20 countries that have suspended and subsequently resumed the gold standard,
demonstrate that suspensions were succesful, because the resumption of the gold standard after the
crisis was exogenously credible. The authors call the gold standard a contingent rule: during wartime
emergency the gold standard rule could be temporarily abandoned on the understanding that after the
emergency had safely passed convertibility would be restored at original parity.
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uncertainty over the timing of an expected return to gold. The Acts of Suspension
provided an o¢ cial indemnity for the Bank  protection from any consequences of
suspension for a specic date in the future or until a lasting peace settlement had been
agreed. These Acts tied the government and Bank of England into credible monetary
strategies and together with a national debate on the correct form monetary constitution,
known as the Bullion Debates, helped formulate sustainable plans for a return to gold. We
will assess how and why contractswere formed between the monetary authorities and the
private sector through Acts of Parliament and Committees of both Houses of Parliament
and what the consequences were for nancial prices from these strategies. Part of the
story of continuing credibility lies with a legal obligation, as outlined in several successive
Acts of Parliament, to return to cash payments at some point in the future. Note also
that although Bank notes became, in e¤ect, legal tender, the government went through
legal contortionsto avoid designating them as such.8 To some extent other institutional
developments, such as tax revenue raising capabilities and the continuing development
of money markets as a conduit for funding government debt, meant that macroeconomic
policies did not have to be excessively destabilising.
At rst it is di¢ cult to understand why the decision to suspend cash payments, after
such a long period of adherence, did not lead to a collapse in the overall monetary unit of
account in Britain, particularly give that such a collapse had happened in France earlier
in the same decade with the adoption of the Assignats. After the hyperination of 1795-
1796, the Directorate wound up the Assignats in February 1796 and demonetised all 44
billion Assignats on 4 February 1797, the same month as the Bank of England was to
suspend cash payments. At the beginning of the rst Napoleonic War in May 1803 the
French monetary and scal system did, supercially, appear stronger than that of its arch
enemy Britain. Napoleons cautious borrowing kept the public debt under control and
his domestic tax reforms and extraction of funds from invaded neighbor countries seemed
to guarantee a steady ow of revenue for the state. The newly formed Banque de France
paid all its obligations in specie, reecting what might be termed a lack of credibility or,
at least, institutional capability. There were a number of key di¤erences in the monetary
and nancial operations carried out by the governments and central banks of Britain and
France during the Napoleonic Wars. Britain was able to adopt a set of exible policies to
nance the war, but Napoleons inability to rise large amount of income in a short period
time was one of the factors that led to his disastrous Russian Campaign. The connection
between sound nance and military success has been explored before (see, for example,
Dickson (1967)) and in this paper we add to that literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores the chain of events that led to
the decision to suspend cash payments. In Section 3I we some issues on resumption
raised by the Suspension. In Sections 4 and 5 we develop models on the management of
balance sheet, gold reserves and public expectations. In section 6 we explore the Banks
contingency plan plans that maintained monetary stability. In section 7 we compare
Englands experience to that of France, and the nal section presents concluding remarks.
8As we explain later, the Government and the Bank preferred to avoid making notes legal tender
as long as the public accepted them, in part to avoid direct comparison with the assignats but also to
promote the view that the Restriction was temporary, see Fetter, p59.
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2 Maintaining Monetary Stability
2.1 The Kings Decisionto Stop Gold Payments
The declaration of war by the French Revolutionary Government in 1793 did not result
in an immediate outow of gold on the Banks reserves, as can be seen from Figure 1.
Considerable sums of specie only started to leave the Bank in 1795 when Prime Minister
Pitt made heavy calls upon the Bank to support his allies in Continental Europe.9 And
so in early 1794 the Bank had about £ 7 million worth of gold in the vaults, by late 1795
it had fallen to £ 3.3 million. The Directors of the Bank became increasingly worried
that lending huge sums of money to the government would clash with the Banks original
charter that forbade it to lend to the government without the permission of Parliament.
The Directors, nevertheless, felt they had to accede to the governments wartime demands,
as such demands were considered essential for the survival of the country.10
In 1796, the drain of reserves became internal.11 According to Thornton (1802) a
class of persons subject to weak and extravagant alarms12 was hoarding guineas in late
1796, which (see Figure 1) created a rapid outow of the Bank of Englands gold reserve.
This classconsisted of people who were preparing for French invasion and attempted
to make their available assets as liquid as possible by withdrawing guineas from both
the Bank of England and the country banks. Sightings of French eets o¤ the coast
escalated the outow of gold and on some days the Bank of Englands daily loss of bullion
was over £ 100,000.13 The Times had reported already on 13 September 1797 that The
apprehension of an invasion of this country seems to have taken possession of mens
minds so strongly that even in every company it becomes a subject of conversation. The
Newcastle banks that were rst to run out of reserves after local farmers, on 18 February
1797, had sold their cattle cheaply and had gone, almost in one body, to their local banks
to cash the notes they had received. The farmersactions alarmed other customers, and
two days later the Newcastle banks decided collectively to stop gold payments. Bank runs
and subsequent suspensions of cash payments followed in the nearby towns of Sunderland
and Durham.14
The nal stroke which precipitated the suspension of the gold standard was a badly
prepared landing of a handful of French soldiers at Fishguard in Wales on 22 February
1797. When the news of this landing reached London on Saturday 25 February, an
emergency meeting of His Majestys Most Honourable Privy Councilwas called for on
9According to Neal (1990) previously the government was able to use foreign exchange bills to nance
its armies on the Continent. Because the British colonial and manufactured goods were much in demand
in Europe, the European merchants willingly accepted the bills drawn in London and used these bills
to pay for the import of the goods from Britain. But when Britains continental allies su¤ered repeated
military reverses, British merchants lost markets for their exports and the bills of exchange drawn in
London had to be extinguished increasingly by means of specie rather than goods. Neal (1990) pp.
201-203.
10Du¤y (1982).
11An internal drain implies that gold is removed from the nancial system and hoarded in England or
Ireland whereas an external drain implies the export of gold to the continent see, Fetter, p19-20.
12Thornton (1802), p. 97.
13Clapham (1944), Vol I, p 271.
14Fetter (1965) p. 21.
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Sunday. George III himself came from Windsor and the meeting was held at the Council
Chamber, Whitehall, on Sunday the 26th February 1797. The outcome of this meeting
was an Order of the Privy Council to suspend the cash payments which was communicated
to the Bank of England by the Council late on a Sunday night. The Council ordered
that a copy of this minute be transmitted to the directors of the Bank of England, and
they are hereby required, on the grounds of the exigency of the case, to conform thereto
until the sense of parliament can be taken as aforesaid.
[Figure 1: The Bullion Reserve of the Bank]
During that weekend in February 1797 the monetary authorities were faced with two
options: (i) let the currency exhaust the gold supply, as the ongoing run on the currency
would surely bring about; or (ii) suspend cash payments and ensure that the extant
monetary gold stock was protected. Anticipating a panic and a bank run to break out on
the following Monday, the Privy Council chose the second option and decided to keep the
Banks doors closed to the public in order to prevent the bearers of the Bank of Englands
notes from converting them to gold and, consequently, emptying the Banks gold reserves.
On Monday 27 February 1797 the following announcement, included in the Order of the
Privy Council, but now entitled as a message from the King, came to mark the start of
the Suspension Period:
It is the unanimous opinion of the Board, that it is indispensably necessary
for the public service, that the directors of the Bank of England should forbear
issuing any cash in payment until the sense of Parliament can be taken on that
subject and the proper measures adopted thereupon for maintaining the means
of circulation and supporting the public and commercial credit of the kingdom
at this important conjuncture.15
The Sunday morning minute of the Privy Council was laid upon the Table of the
House of Commons on the following day by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on George
IIIs direction.16 The King sent a following message to the House:
His Majesty thinks it proper to communicate to the House of Commons,
without delay, the measure adopted to obviate the E¤ects which might be
occasioned by the unusual Demand of Specie lately made from di¤erent parts
of the country on the metropolis. The peculiar nature and exigency of the case
appeared to require, in the rst instance, the measure contained in the Order
of Council, which His Majesty has directed to be laid before the House. In
recommending this important subject to the immediate and serious attention
of the House of Commons, His Majesty has relied, with utmost condence,
on the experienced wisdom and rmness of his Parliament, for taking such
measures as may be best calculated to meet any temporary pressure, and to
call forth, in the most e¤ectual manner, the extensive resources of the His
Kingdoms, in support of their public and commercial credit, and in defence of
their dearest interests.
15The Times 28 February 1797.
16Journal of the House of Commons, 1796-7, III, pp348-9.
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At the Bank of England, the following notice was issued on Monday morning to people
wanting to exchange their bank notes for specie:
Bank of England, Feb. 27th, 1797.
In consequence of an order of his Majestys Privy Council, notied to the
bank last night, a copy of which is hereunto annexed, the governor, deputy-
governor, and directors of the Bank of England think it their duty to inform
the proprietors of the bank stock, as well as the public at large, that the
general concerns of the bank are in the most a­ uent and prosperous situation,
and such as to preclude every doubt as to the security of its notes. The
directors mean to continue their usual discounts for the accommodation of
the commercial interest, paying the amount in bank notes, and the dividend
warrants will be paid in the same manner.17
Above detailed survey of the historical documents demonstrate three facts that have
a fundamental importance for our arguments that we present in this paper. Firstly, both
Privy Council and subsequently the Houses of Parliament not only tied the Bank of
Englands hands by making cash payments illegal but also indemnied the Bank against
any direct costs from the suspension of cash payments. Secondly, the chain of decisions
the Privy Councils order that was communicated simultaneously to the Bank and the
House and immediately after this to the public shows that the decision to suspend was
not an arbitrary decision by the Bank of England alone. Finally, at the point of the
suspension all political institutions such as the Bank, Parliament and the government
but also the London Money Markets showed considerable concordance. Their objective
seemed to have been to ensure smooth operations of the credit markets in spite of the war
and suspension of convertibility. In the name of monetary stability the authorities, which
were accustomed to making autocratic decisions, on this occasion paid special attention
to the communication of their policy actions openly and systematically to the markets,
as well as to the wider public. The Bank, as can be read from its announcement, made it
clear that its other businesses continued as usual: there were no changes in discounting,
private or public loans or in relationship with its proprietors.
2.2 Credit Constraints in the London Money Market
2.2.1 The structure of the Banking System
The English banking system developed as a three-layered pyramid, as shown in Figure
2, consisting of the Bank of England, the rest of the London private banks and the
country banks.18 By the second half of the eighteenth century, Bank of England notes
had become the main currency used in large payments in London.19 Bank of England
notes rarely circulated outside the London area, where the country bank notes were the
main medium of exchange - especially after 1750 the growth of the country banks had
increased regional money supply. The system resembled the gold exchange standard of
17Reprinted in Gilbart (1834), p 34.
18Fetter (1965). Pressnell (1956) pp. 75-76.
19Pressnell (1956).
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the twentieth century: the private bank notes were convertible to Bank of England notes,
which in turn were convertible into gold on demand. Many of the London bankers kept
their reserves in Bank notes or towards the end of the eighteenth century, kept accounts
in the Bank. They had, therefore, direct access to Bank of Englands notes and bullion.
The London private banks integrated small country bank units by supplying links between
country banks in agricultural areas, that had excess capital for lending, and the industrial
areas, which had excess demand for capital.
[Figure 2: Credit Pyramid in the Eighteenth Century]
The enactment of the Bubble Act of 1720 limited the maximum partners of note-
issuing banks in England and Wales to six and gave the Bank of England a monopoly in
joint stock banking.20 The capital of any other note issuing bank was therefore limited to
what could be provided by up to six partners, which gave the Bank of England a virtual
monopoly on note issue in and around London.21 The number of the country banks grew
hand-in-hand with the Industrial Revolution. The growth was, however, uneven, as it was
typical for country bank numbers to fall in an economic crisis with their note circulation
down by a third or by half, but one or two years after each crisis both their number
and note issue could again be greater. In 1750 there were twelve country banks outside
London but in 1793, there were nearly 400.22 The number of London private banks almost
doubled in the second half of the eighteenth century. Data on the circulation of country
bank notes is not available until 1804 and onwards when the law required stamp duties
to be paid on private notes. The value of all notes stamped in 1805 was £ 10,700,000
implying that private bank notes may have comprised almost forty percent of the total
paper money in circulation.23
The Bank of Englands control over the country banks was not mechanical as they
did not keep substantial amounts of reserves in the Bank notes or gold, but in rather
deposits with London private banks.24 Therefore, the main inuence of the Bank over the
country banks was through the London money market. If there was a small, urgent, need
for money, coin was still the only form of money available as small notes were illegal in
England and Wales. The country banks then drew down their gold deposits from London,
and London banks drew cash from their accounts with the Bank. According to Pressnell
(1956) to some extent the Bank functioned as a lender of last resort: when money was
scarce country banks in general turned to London much as London rms turned to the
Bank of England as the lender of last resort.25
2.2.2 The Consequences of Bullion Shortages
Let us analyse implications of Suspension to the Banks private business in particular
from the viewpoint of the Banks customers: London merchants and entrepreneurs. Low
206 Geo. I, c. 18.
21Dowd (1989) p. 118.
22Pressnell (1956) pp. 5-7.
23Pressnell (1956) p. 188. Naturally, we have to be careful in placing too much weight on these
estimates.
24Pressnell (1956) p.76.
25Pressnell (1956) p. 76.
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bullion levels and a shortage of notes would have resulted in di¤erent types of monetary
problems. Bullion reserves would enable the continuation of the gold convertibility of
the note issue and, traditionally, underpinned the value of paper money. Nevertheless,
the credit and payments structure in Britain was not dependent on the gold reserve,
rather on the continued circulation of Bank of England notes, which would fall if
the public permanently converted their paper currency into gold. London merchants
and entrepreneurs were connected by a multilateral payments network rather than a
sequence of bilateral agreements. The failure of one house would have the potential to
be detrimental for other businesses and a crisis in London may have spread quickly to
the rest of the country, as London operated as the nancial intermediary between the
industrial and agricultural sectors.
[Figure 3: The Bank of England Liabilities]
Figure 3 report the published quantity of Bank of England notes outstanding for the
25th February from 1787 to 1797 and then weekly from 10th June 1796 to 18th March
1787. The reduction in Bank of England notes outstanding in the week of suspension
reduced central bank money back to a level not observed for 10 years and from the
weekly numbers we can see the magnitude of the run during the course of February
1797, with notes in circulation falling by nearly 20% in a month or so. As a result
of diminishing circulation, there was considerable distress arising in London, according
to Henry Thornton: [there] was a distress for notes of the Bank of England,26 which
were by far the most important medium of exchange in this commercial and nancial
centre of the country. The whole credit system, where payments...are most of them
promised beforehand,27 had been built on Bank of England notes. For a few days before
the suspension demand for the Bank of England notes was so high that the interest on
Exchequer bills rose as high as 16 or 17 percent as people sought to move from short term
government debt to convertible currency.28 Thornton estimated that:
A diminution, for instance, of one-third or two-fths, might, perhaps, be
su¢ cient to produce a very general insolvency in London, of which the e¤ect
would be the suspension of condence, the derangement of commerce and the
stagnation of manufactures throughout the country.29
Figure 3 the circulation of the Bank Notes fell seventeen percent between the last
quarter of 1795 and last quarter of 1796, meanwhile the gold stock of the Bank reduced
almost forty-ve percent, shown in Figure1. Despite the variations in the Banks monetary
gold stock, stabilisation of circulation was crucial for the credit markets at this most
critical of times. If they reduce materially their notes in time of di¢ culty and distress,
there are no other Notes which are ready to supply the deciency in the circulation.30
E¤ective alternatives to the Bank of England notes did not exist, as country bank or
26Thornton (1802) p. 113.
27Thornton (1802) p. 113.
28Thornton (1802) p. 113.
29Thornton (1802) p. 114.
30Thornton (1802) p. 288.
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private bank notes did not circulate in London. Converted monetary gold did not return
to circulation, as it was smuggled from the country or put away in hoards. Sir Francis
Baring, London merchant banker, had recognised that the Bank notes were not just a
substitute for money, but the basis of the monetary system.31 Merchants in London were
not interested in specie: The guineas applied for by persons in London, was, generally
speaking, account of people in the country, Thornton explains.32
[Figure 4: Bank notes (weekly in Feb 1797)]
The Privy Councils declaration (See Appendix) and orders of the King and the Bank
presented in section II reveal how they seemed to have been equally concerned about the
state of circulation and credit, as of the bullion reserves of the Bank. The traditional
argument (for example Cannans Introduction to the Bullion Report, 1810, page x) that
the gold convertibility rule was suspended in order only to protect the Banks gold reserves
seems to us, therefore, an oversimplication in the light of the published announcements.
The direct link between the Banks note circulation and private credit becomes even
more obvious when we assess the way how the London Money Markets took the news
of the suspension. While the order to suspend cash payments by the Privy Council was
being published on Money 27 February, the merchants and bankers of London had their
own meeting in the Manor House to consider of a general Resolution to promote the
universal Circulation of Bank of England Notes instead of Specie.33 They declared that:
...we will not refuse to receive Bank Notes in Payment of any Sum of
Money to be paid to us, and we will use our utmost Endeavours to make all
our Payments in the same Manner.34
The declaration was then published in The Times bearing the signatures of many
hundreds of leading business houses. According The Times the resolution did credit
to the patriotism and loyalty of the Gentlemen presentas it was supposed to prevent
Embarrassments to Public Credit35 Gilbart (1834) notes that similar resolutions was
adopted by other public assemblies.
The merchants and bankers had common interests with the directors of the Bank. If
the Bank notes had fallen on discount by not being accepted at their face value there
would have been delays in payments and other obligations that would have brought down
many large London houses and with them the country banks, which in turn had close
links with the local industries. Nevertheless, practical men of the City of London would
not have supported policy in which they did not have faith and therefore merchants
willingness to accept the Bank notes can be seen as a testimony of the Banks credibility
and initial success of the experiment.
31Baring (1797) p. 6.
32Thornton (1802) pp. 112-113.
33The Times 28 February 1797.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
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3 Enforcing the contract of resumption
3.1 Lawful Suspension of Cash Payments
The transition between the two monetary regimescaused relatively little disturbance and
the condence in the payment system after the bank run in London and the provinces
was restored. Figure1 illustrates the improvement in the gold reserves of the Bank from
the lowest point of £ 982,000 in March 1797 to over £ 4,000,000 in August 1797, and the
reserves continued to grow for the next year and half. Figure 5 shows how the exchanges
with Hamburg improved immediately and uctuations in the exchange rate and price of
gold were hardly di¤erent from those under convertibility. The long-term interest rate
peaked in May 1798, as can be seen in Figure 6, but fell to the pre-suspension level by
1799.
[Figure 5: Nominal Variables during the Suspension]
These reassuring developments in nancial markets resulted from a contingency plan
that aimed at maintaining the value of the circulating medium. The authorities took two
courses of action: First, suspension required some development in the functions of note
issue, in terms of payments and the eventual convertibility of note issuance. After the
gold and silver coins had disappeared to hoards or smuggled abroad, there was practically
no legal tender currency in circulation. Only a few days after the suspension Parliament
authorised the Bank to issue previously prohibited notes of a face value less than £ 5 to
help with the shortage of circulating medium. Those people who had used only coin in
the past, were now introduced to the inconvertible paper money.36 In many regions the
Bank of England notes started to circulate alongside the country bank notes for the rst
time.37 Secondly, the authorities had to conrm the status of the Bank of England notes
as de facto legal tender currency by legislation. The Bank Restriction Act passed on May
3 assured the public that:
all Sums of Money, which now are or shall become payable for any Part of
the Public revenue shall be accepted by the Collectors, Receivers and other
O¢ cers at the Revenue, authorised to receive the same, in Notes of the said
Governor and Company, expressed to be payable on Demand, if o¤ered to be
to paid.38
According to Fetter at this point the Bank was careful not to call the Bank of England
notes legal tender currency, because they could have become associated in the public mind
with the failed Assignats in France39 and given an impression that the monetary base had
shifted permanently. Only after Lord King in 1811 had announced that he would no longer
receive his tenantspayments of their rents in Bank notes at face value, but in revised
value according to the amount of paper money which would be required to purchase
36Clapham (1944) Vol. II p. 3.
37Pressnell (1956) p. 153.
38Act 37 Geo III c.45.
39Fetter (1965) p. 59.
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it (gold) at the present market price40 Bank notes were made legal tender by Act of
Parliament.41
3.2 Parliamentary Committee on Suspension
Immediately after the suspension, in the spirit of scientic enquiry, the House of Commons
passed a motion to appoint a Committee of Secrecy to
examine and state the total amount of outstanding demands on the Bank
of England, and likewise of the Funds for discharging the same, and to
report the result thereof to the House and also to enquire in the causes which
have produced the Order of the Council42, together with their opinion on the
necessity of providing for the conrmation and continuance, for a time to be
limited43, of measures taken in pursuance of the Minute of the Council on the
26th Instant.44
The rst amendment was passed by 244 votes to 86. The nal motion was carried on
1st March by 161 votes to 67.45 The Committee made reports to the House on 3rd and
7th March and on 9th March the House sat in Committee of the whole House to consider
the reports. Two main issues emerged: (i) that the Committee of Secrecy requested that
a Bill be brought to conrm and continue, for a time limited, the restriction order by the
Council,46 and (ii) that the terms of enquiry be broadened to consider also the necessity
of the Minute of the Council.
The links between cash payments as part of the network of nancial and commercial
payments and also the Banks role as mediating between government borrowing and the
City of London are underlined on 12th March. It is reported that on 25th February,
the Bank had £ 17,597280 of assets and liabilities of £ 13,770,390. But alongside these
raw numbers, the government owed the Bank £ 9,964,413 for advances, which excluded
permanent debt of £ 11,686,800. The House passed motion by 185 votes to 45 to repay
the Bank as quickly a possible.47
The Bill for conrming and continuing the Minute of Council was passed for the third
time on 7th April and an amendment allowing for limited payments was also passed by
103 votes to 31. The Act, c.45, is a remarkable piece of drafting. with provisions for (i)
a Bank indemnity for All acts done in pursuance of the Minute of Council; (ii) it became
unlawful for the Bank to issue Cash payments except for clearly dened reasons; (iii) that
no suit could be brought to force the Bank to pay cash and no costs of any such suit
would be allowable; (iv) small amounts under 20 shilling could be payable by cash and
any Orders of Council requiring payment of cash to the Military would be payable of up
40Feavearyear (1963) p. 204.
41Act 51 Geo III, c. 127. It is a matter of interpretation as to how clear-cut the Act was, but in
practice it made the Bank notes legal tender.
42Added by ammendement.
43Added by ammendement.
44JHC, 1796-7, Geo III, p353.
45JHC, 1796-7, Geo III, p356.
46JHC, 1796-7, Geo III, p383.
47JHC, 1796-7, Geo III, p387.
12
to £ 600,000; (v) the Bank could pay up to 3/4 of any cash sum given to it since 7th April
i.e. it could pay some fraction of cash on new gold deposits; (vi) the Bank could advance
London, Westminster and Southwark bankers up to £ 100,000 of cash and to the Bank of
Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland up to £ 25,000 each; (vii) notes were deemed to be
cash; (viii) cash was to be used to meet bail requirements and taxes; (ix) could issue cash
in proportion to any increase in Bank bullion holdings since 26th February 1797 and (x)
nally, that the Act would continue only until 24th June 1797. In the event, Suspension
continued throughout the course of the Napoleonic Wars.
The Bill was due to be re-considered by 24th June and duly on 20th June a Bill
to continue, the Act for conrming the Minute of Council was passed and the Act was
published in the Statute Books on 24th June. In each subsequent case, the Act was
passed for a limited time and the date of its expiry or in relation to a Treaty of Peace
was explicitly stated. In April 1803 a new war put an end to the discussions about early
resumption. The text of the Acts after 1815 increasingly make clear the wish to return to
Cash payments at the earliest opportunity but retain and enshrine the Bank of Englands
ability to e¤ect this return gradually, as conditions permitted. No discussion or possibility
of a return to Cash at anything other than the original price was mentioned in the Acts.
Much attention was drawn in the Parliamentary debates into discovering why
suspension was necessary, what were it causes and in the emphasis of its nature as a
temporary expediency. There is little evidence in the extant Parliamentary records of
any great dispute in the choice to suspend. And it was crucial for the success of the
experiment that such arguments would not be able to disrupt the system during the
Suspension Period. The longest gap between the renewal of Acts was 14 years, and one
possible interpretation their purpose was to tie the hands of successive policymakers 
amongst them six di¤erent prime ministers who were in charge of the cabinet between
1797-1821 and 13 Governors of the Bank who had to be elected biannually according to the
Banks charter. The establishment of a series of Committees of Parliamentary enquiries
combined the development of early monetary theory, practical banking observations and
considerable statistical analysis of price and nancial data.
[Table 1: Bank Restriction Acts of Parliament]
3.3 Re-anchoring the price level
The precise e¤ect of the Acts cannot be veried from the nominal data, i.e. there is
no evidence that the long term interest rates  the consol rate would have reduced
after passing the Bank Restriction Act. However, the Acts were an important tool
with which the parliament aimed to increase the credibility of eventual resumption of
the gold standard, and to ensure that markets expected the government and the Bank
to resume the gold standard in the future. In the existing literature, credibility has
often been explained by other political and institutional developments: Britain had the
most democratic parliament in the contemporary world, the Financial Revolution at the
end of the seventeenth century had created an e¢ cient system of public nance, and
the country had the worlds most developed private capital markets with a centralised
exchange system. Furthermore, society was free, with relative freedom of press and speech
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that enabled the public to criticise and monitor the authorities.48 These factors, the
argument continues, forced the government and the Bank not only to consider short-term
prot opportunities, but long-term benets to the whole country. The Directors of the
Bank understood that the formidable weapon of unrestricted money creation49 had not
been placed in their hands at the beginning of the Suspension Period. The Bank did not
use inationary monetary policy extensively and the war was primarily funded by scal
innovations, such as income tax and long-term borrowing, which meant that monetary
policy did not have to become too accommodating.
During the course of the Suspension Period the Banks policy was not always faultless
and it received sharp criticism. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 5, during the rst ten
years of suspension the growth of notes and rise in the price level was moderate, but
then, as a result of the commercial boom of 1808-1810, the Banks discount policy and
the overheating that followed,50 the stock of Bank of England notes increased from £ 17
million in 1808 to £ 27 million in 1816, the market price of gold raised to 30 percent above
the par by 1811 and the exchange rate depreciated sharply. The public found steadily
climbing prices confusing, as for centuries prices had simply moved according to the
quality of harvests. Fast credit expansion, disparity between British and overseas prices,
a high premium on gold (agio) the depreciation in the exchange rate sparked a furious
conict of opinions over the conduct of monetary policy called the Bullion Debates. The
bullionists, whose leading gure was David Ricardo, blamed the Bank of England as they
tended to consider the inconvertible pound to be something unnaturaland a reason for
all existing monetary problems.
In early 1810, Parliament appointed the Select Committee on the High Price of
Bullionto inquire into the high price of gold, so as to nd out whether the Bank had
issued the right amount of money or over-issued. Between February and May 1810 the
Committee held thirty-one meetings and examined twenty-nine witnesses, including the
directors of the Bank, and on 8 June 1810 the committee published its Report from the
Select Committee of the House of Commons on the High Price of Bullion, in which it took
into consideration the State of the Circulating Medium, and of the Exchanges between
Great Britain and Foreign Parts.51 The Committee did not compile price indexes, but
aimed to be objective by presenting time series of the market price of gold, exchange
rate and the Bank of Englands note circulation: the market price of gold was at £ 4.12s.
per oz, 15 percent above the Mint price of £ 3.17s.101
2
d and that the exchanges, with
Hamburg, Amsterdam, Paris and Portugal correspondingly depressed as low as 16 to 20
percent below the par.52
The Committees conclusion was that the rise in the price of bullion and the adverse
exchanges had been caused solely by an over-issue by the Bank of England and accused
the Bank of pursuing real bill policy by accepting all sound paper without considering
its desirability in terms of national monetary policy.53 The inuence of the country
48North and Weingast (1989).
49Andréadès (1909) p. 191.
50Du¤y (1982).
51Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 3.
52Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925), pp. 3-5.
53Fetter (1965) p. 41.
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bank issue was noted by saying that the quantity of country bank paper was dependent
upon the quantity of Bank of England paper, increasing and decreasing with it and by
increasing its notes, the Bank made more plentiful the reserves into which every country
banker was required to redeem his own notes.54
The Bullion Committees Report is one of the most important documents in British
monetary history and it has been treated as an authoritative and contemporaneous
analysis of the Banks monetary policy. Du¤y (1982), however, argues that The
Bullion Report overestimates the Banks sentiment towards anti-bullionism and does not
accurately describe the Banks credit policy. Furthermore, some of the recommendations
of the Report such as resumption in two years time, were unrealistic because the paper
money stock was high compared with the Banks monetary gold stock and the gap between
the market and monetary price of gold was wide. In spite of these weaknesses, the
Parliamentary Committee and the Report itself were powerful mechanisms that enforced
the original contract between the Bank and the society and paved the way to resumption
of the gold standard after the war.
4 Asset-Liability Management during the
Suspension
4.1 The Private Central Bank
The Banks business as usualattitude at the point of suspension stemmed largely from
the Banks desire to safeguard its proprietors share holders interests. The Bank
of England might have been the rst public bank in the British Isles, but its ownership
remained in private hands until its nationalisation in 1946. According to Fetter (1965)
the Bank of England was not established in 1694 to perform central banking functions
any more than the goldsmiths.55 During the course of the eighteenth century the Banks
ambiguous position as a privately-owned-for-prot establishment that was in charge of
public nance was not discussed in any organised manner. Legislation and a number
of regulations connected the Bank with the political institutions: Firstly, parliament
periodically conrmed the Banks existence by passing the Banks Charter; secondly, the
Bank had received a rightto grant advances on the exchequer bills; and nally, in return
to loans to the government, a set of acts passed between 1697 and 1742 strengthened
the Banks position by giving it a monopoly in joint stock banking and in the issue of
joint stock bank notes.56 Yet, the Bank of Englands daily operations, its management
and organisational structure manifested that it was a private monied company which
issued shares, paid dividends and made prots. The Banks owners consisted of London
merchants and from the very beginning the highest decision making body of the Bank
was the Banks Court of Directors that consisted of the Governor, the Deputy Governor
and 24 Directors. Members of the Court of Directors as well as majority of the Banks
proprietors came from the merchant class and were thus in social and economic terms
54Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 61-66.
55Fetter (1965) p. 23.
56Santoni (1984).
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separate from the members of parliament that came from the landed gentry. Furthermore,
the Banks explicit role as a trusted organ of the London merchants and an agency
of government nance was displayed by its main sources of revenue: the governments
advances and trade credit discounts of London merchants and entrepreneurs.
It was only during the Suspension Period that the idea that the Bank of England might
have a special role as a bankersbank started to develop. The questions of independence of
the Bank from the government and the Banks role as a lender of the last resort were raised
during the Bullion Debates and, as a¢ rmed by Fetter (1965), their acknowledgement
became the key feature of the pre-1914 monetary orthodoxy. From 1694 until the 1790s
the Bank of England operated as a private establishment that was dominantly in private
control and, therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the Banks private concerns had a
great weight in decision to suspend cash payments.
4.2 Maturity Transformation via Suspension
In this section we assess what implications the launch of the French Wars in 1793
and increased pressure by the government to the Bank to support warfare had on the
Banks private business. To analyse these concerns in objective manner we will start
by constructing the Banks balance sheet. Then we will calculate the Banks value and
discuss how default of its key policy management of the gold standard reduced its
operative and its shareholders risk. At the end of this section we alter our approach
slightly and discuss how the decision to suspend pacied the London money markets and
provided relief to the Banks customers: the London merchants and entrepreneurs.
Cannan (1925), Table 2, presents the following stylised version of the Bank of
Englands balance sheet at the end of the eighteenth century. The Bank of Englands
assets consisted of securities that were held against the government and against the private
sector. Exchequer bills interest-bearing bills that were issued in return for money lent
to the government made up the largest proportion of the public credit held by the Bank.
The Banks private advances consisted of loans and trade discounts. The Banks discount
business was as old as the Bank itself: In May 1695 the Bank decided that any safe man
might discount up to £ 3000, but at 4 1
2
percent even if he did not keep his cash in the
Bank. The Bank discounted promissory notes, inland and foreign bills of exchange and
papers of various private institutions.57 The most liquid asset the Bank hold was its coin
and bullion reserve.
Table 2: The Balance Sheet of the Bank of England
Assets Liabilities
Public Loans Notes
Private Loans Deposits
Private Discounts Equity
Bullion
57Clapham (1944) pp. 123-129.
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The Bank of Englands liabilities comprised notes outstanding which before the
Suspension Period mainly circulated in London and were, towards the end of the
eighteenth century, used in all large private business transactions in the capital. The
Bank notes promised to pay the bearer on demand in specie and they were more liquid
than private bank notes which were usually convertible either to the Bank notes or to
specie but only after delay. The Bank accepted deposits from the public which were also
convertible to gold on demand. The nal category of the Banks liabilities was its equity
held by its proprietors and traded at the London Stock Exchange.
We can understand suspension of convertibility and the specic matching of the return
to convertibility to the end of the wars, as a way of minimising the sensitivity of the Bank
of Englands value to changes in gearing, i.e. the ratio between the value of its debt to
equity. Higher levels of gearing will tend to amplify the impact of shocks on underlying
value of the Bank but if the scale of maturity transformation can be limited then the
sensitivity can be reduces. Suspension allowed the Bank to match the maturity of longer
term assets, driven by the duration of the war, to the notes, which would not be payable
until the end of the war.
From the balance sheet we are able to calculate the value of the Bank of England, Vt,
which is simply the market value of its capital that is equivalent to the di¤erence between
the present value of assets, A, and liabilities, L:
Vt = A (t; t+ A)  L (t; t+ L) (1)
Let us suppose, for the moment that interest rates r (t) across the asset and liability
structure are identical. Under usury laws this assumption may be reasonable as all private
loans and discounts other than East India Bonds were subject to the legal prohibition of
interest above ve percent, even though the market rates would have been higher. As can
be seen from Figure 6, during peace the market rate of interest rarely increased above the
usury ceiling and even then only temporarily, but it did vary.
[Figure 6: Short and Long-term Interest Rates]
The return on assets corresponds to the income from loans to the public and private sector
and the payment due to liabilities, which would correspond to the interest paid on notes
discounted. Let us abstract from interest rate di¤erentials for the moment and consider
the value of the Bank simply in terms of the maturity structure of assets and liabilities:
Vt = V [r (t)] = Ae
 Ar(t)   Le Lr(t); (2)
where A and L denote the duration of assets and liabilities. By dividing both sides with
Vt we get
1 =
Ae Ar(t)   Le Lr(t)
Vt
=) 1  Ae
 Ar(t)
Vt
=  Le
 Lr(t)
Vt
(3)
By taking a partial derivative respect to r we have
 =   1
V
V
r
=
AAe
 Ar(t)   LLe Lr(t)
Vt
; (4)
which can be rewritten as
 = A + (1  ) L; (5)
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where  = Ae
 Ar(t)
Vt
. The key variables here to understanding interest sensitivity, , is .
Parameter  measures both leverage a ratio between the value of assets and the value of
the Bank and the duration of assets and liabilities, A and L. Higher levels of leverage
 and a maturity transformation with A > L, tends to increase the impact of interest
rate changes on the value of the Bank. But if the duration of liabilities is matched to
that of assets then there is some attentuation in the impact of interest rate changes on
the value of the Bank equity.
Proposition 1 The impact of changes in interest rates on the net worth of the Bank of
England increases in leverage and the extent of maturity transformation.
Proof. see (5).
Generally the maturity of banksassets in the past as in the present day are longer
than the maturity of their liabilities. Borrowers tend toward longer-term maturities used
to nance long-lived assets compared with the preferences of investors and depositors,
who generally want to be able to access their funds quickly. In the eighteenth century the
Bank of England was only one of the London nancial intermediaries that earned prots
by engaging in maturity transformation borrowing shorter-term to nance longer-term
lending. The Bank took deposits and paid out notes for the publics gold deposits, and
with this capital it engaged in discounting business.
Modern private banks benet from various deposit insurance protection schemes which
discourage their creditors and depositors from demanding their money back all at the
same time and also from national central banks that are willing to extend their credit if
necessary and to function as a lender of the last resort. In the 1790s the Bank of England
did not enjoy of any protection by any external institution. During the temporary banking
panics of the eighteenth century the Bank had protected its bullion reserve by paying out
interest bearing notes instead of cash. The Bank could have attempted to reduce the
circulation of its notes but its ability to regulate demand for credit was limited as a result
of the usury law. The gold standard rule that entitled the bearers of the Bank notes to get
their paper money converted to gold on demand made the Bank of England vulnerable
especially when gold demand shocks became persistent.
The driving force of much of the expansion in leverage in the 1790s was unfunded loans
to the government. As a result of the French War these loans had an uncertain duration
and the Bank was not able easily to control their volume. During the peace the government
had been able to raise income via the London Stock Exchange, but during war the markets
did not always absorb as many bills as the Treasury wished to dispose of. On these
occasions the Bank directors felt obligated to satisfy the wartime demand and bought
exchequer bills at the direct request of Treasury brokers.58 The heavy responsibility of
the Governors was not eased by the fact that the Banks public advances were subject to
parliamentary control and it was technically prohibited from buying Exchequer bills or
making advances to the Treasury without Parliaments permission because during time of
war Parliament was not, however, keen to enforce the law or limit Treasurys needs.59 As
58Clapham (1944) p. 62. Gayer et al. (1953) Microlm appendix p. 1388.
59Gayer et al. (1953) Microlm appendix p. 1386.
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can be seen in Figure 7, the ratio of the Banks unfunded debt holdings to total unfunded
debt peaked in 1797 at 80 percent: the Bank was thus the dominant institution that
absorbed the government short time paper.
[Figure 7: Ratio of the Banks unfunded and funded debt holdings]
The Bank faced a problematic situation in 1797: by continuing gold conversion the
Bank ran a risk of becoming insolvent, by constraining the government advances the
future of the country might have been in danger and, as will be discussed below, by
reducing private discounts the Bank might have spread panic in London money markets
during a period when other London private banks were cutting credit. Although the
suspension was a radical solution, it was sensible one regarding the Banks balance sheet.
With a Suspension until Peacethe Bank of England was able to match the maturity
transformation which extended the maturity of its liabilities L to match those of its
assets A. From (5) we can see that the interest rate sensitivity  reduces to a parameter
L that measures the duration of liabilities. The Banks directors understood that the
government, which wanted its payments often in cash to be able to support armies on the
Continent, would not have been able to repay until after the arrival of peace. War time
conditions, especially warfare at sea, meant that the Bank or the government were not
able to import gold to replace what left the country. So by suspending cash payments
maturity of liabilities notes and deposits that under normal times were convertible to
gold immediately matched that of assets.
What other implications did the suspension have? At a stroke, for a given level of
leverage, the risk in Bank of England share prices was reduced. As can be seen from
Figure 3, the value of the Bank of Englands equity fell from £ 20.5 million in 1794 to
£ 13.7 million in 1797 but after the suspension the valuation increased rapidly reaching
its pre-suspension level by 1801. During the suspension volume of private and public
discounts increased and the Banks share price reects its increased protability. The
lower panel of the Figure shows that gearing was closely related to interest rates changes
but that by limiting the maturity transformation problem with suspension, the Bank need
not have been too constrained in its operations.
4.3 The Pre-suspension Palmer rule
After establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 gold reserve management evolved
as a core monetary policy which increased the credibility of the monetary system. The
fact that country banks had a right to print and circulate their own notes emphasized
the importance of gold reserve policy. Without a monopoly to issue paper currency in
the realm any money supply target policies of the Bank would only have had limited
e¢ ciency. The Banks reserve policy was successful: in spite of the recurrent wars of
the eighteenth century the Bank of England was able to maintain gold convertibility
without any signicant distractions until the late 1790s. As the gold supply and minting
conditions were secure, a relatively low gold backing rate was su¢ cient to support the
monetary system. According to Fetter (1965) there was no generally accepted theory or
even debate on money and banking before the suspension period the gold standard was
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enough to stabilise the price level which laid the basis for positive development of capital
markets and trade.
We turn to the consideration of the Banks balance sheet from the perspective of
reserve management, which allows us to think of this as a portfolio problem. It was
only from about 1827 onwards when the Bank adopted an explicit rule to target the
cash ratio. This rule became known as the Palmer Ruleafter Horsley Palmer who was
governor from 1830-1833, and who rst described this rule for the Committee of the Bank
Charter in 1832. The Palmer Rule outlined a targeted gold reserve ratio (to notes and
deposits) of 30 percent. Some historical sources, however, suggest that some kind of
ratio was traditionally targeted by the Bank prior to and even during some stages of the
Restriction Period. For example, Horseld (1953) argues that some informal target was
monitored already before the suspension:60
Examination of Daniel Giles (Governor) on March 31st 1797:
Q: Do not the Bank Directors regulate issues upon discounts by an
attention to the proportion of Cash in their co¤ers and the amount of their
outstanding Notes?
A: They ought to do so and generally do regulate their conduct in
consequence.
Examination of Samuel Bosanquet on 14th March 1797:
A: It is possible for the Bank to be in a much safer situation, with a much
smaller sum in specie when the public a¤airs are prosperous, than with a much
larger sum and an apprehension that the sum is draining away.
In the next section we consider the Palmer Rule as a balance sheet problem, and ask
why the Bank was not able or willing to follow an explicit gold reserve rule in 1797.
4.4 Prots and the Gold Reserve
If we think of the management of cash, or gold, reserves as a portfolio problem, see
Chadha and Corrado (2012),61 we can adopt a simple expression for the Bank of Englands
reserves within period bank expected returns. Let us rst consider the Banks prots t.
We continue to consider the Bank of England as a private establishment. The Banks
problem is to maximize total returns within period subject to the returns from (i) loans
Lt, which, as can see from the table in section III, consist of private and public liabilities
and are lent out at the gross interest rate of RLt ; (ii) bullion reserve that is held at the
central bank, AGt , that is assumed to pay the expected relative price of gold,
h
Et
PGt+1
Pt+1
i
;
and (iii) the payment of interest, RDt , to holders of Bank of England liabilities, Dt:
max t
rt
= RLt Lt +

Et
PGt+1
Pt+1

AGt  RDt Dt: (6)
The Bank of Englands prots could be considered to be a subject to a side-constraint
motivated by concerns about the management of the bullion reserve. We assume that
60Horseld (1953) p 170.
61We modify to some degree the original set-up in Chadha and Corrado (2012).
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there is an exogenous target for the level of reserves, AG, which seems to have been
around 30 percent. The costs of reserve management, Ct, are then modelled in two parts:
the central bank smooths bullion reserves, for any deviations of reserves from target and
will be subject to a liquidity preference term, t.
s.t. Ct =
1
2
( AG   AGt )2 + t( AG   AGt ): (7)
The Bank would have smoothed reserves over time, because it did not wish to change the
allocation between cash and loans too quickly from period to period, as these may have
signalled mismanagement of previous asset allocations or ran reputational risks. The
liquidity preference term, t, represents shifts in the Bank of Englandchosen level of
reserves, or what we might call today liquidity preference. Increase in t corresponds to
an increase in the demand for reserves. Note that by choosing the reserve level, bankss
asset, Lt + AGt , are now fully determined and so are liabilities, Dt. From the balance
sheet, Lt = Dt   AGt so we can substitute out and write the Lagrangian as:
t = R
L
t (Dt   AGt ) +

Et
PGt+1
Pt+1

AGt  RDt Dt + t

Ct   1
2
( AG   AGt )2   t( AG   AGt )

:
(8)
The rst order condition respect to AGt becomes:
@t
@AGt
=  RLt +

Et
PGt+1
Pt+1

+ t

( AG   AGt ) + t

= 0: (9)
The Lagrange multiplier t can be interpreted as a measure of the shadow value of reserve
management, which is given by the ratio of prots on reserves to the precautionary
motives for holding bullion reserves:
t =
RLt  
h
Et
PGt+1
Pt+1
i
( AG   AGt ) + t
; (10)
The above relationship can also be considered as a measure of reserves holding. If we
consider the numerator, the di¤erence between the return on loans and return on bullion
reserves, to be equal to the denominator, penalty from deviating from the bullion target
and the shadow value of reserve management, t becomes one and reects the equal
relative importance of the two arguments. From this we can solve for the optimal level of
bank reserves:
AGt   AG =

Et
PGt+1
Pt+1

 RLt + t: (11)
Hence at the optimal prot rate the reserve ratio is determined by the return on
reserves minus the returns on loans. If the loan rate is higher than the return on reserves
there is an incentive for banks to hold reserves below the target level, AG. But with a
su¢ ciently high preference for liquidity, t, then reserves will be held in excess even ifh
Et
PGt+1
Pt+1
i
  RLt is negative. Another way to think about this expression is that the Bank
accumulated gold reserve requirements according to this expression, where t is liquidity
preference. We could in principle decompose the observed cash ratio into relative returns
and preference for liquidity and in Figure 8 we show both the actual gold ratio and that
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which would have been in the absence of any explicit liquidity preference.62 The gap
between the two lines is an illustrative measure of the liquidity preference and we suggest
that in 1797 and for some years afterwards there was a sharp increase in the Banks
preference (BoE) for liquidity and again after Waterloo, in the run up to resumption.
4.5 Reserve Management under the Suspension
Figure 8 shows the cash ratio leading up to the Suspension and the subsequent years.
We can see four distinct phases here: Firstly, the early years of the war led ultimately
to the drain of cash in 1797 and the suspension of convertibility. At the end of the
eighteenth century the British economy experienced a series of shocks such as the war,
large government expenditure, volatile interest rates and bad harvests, which in past
had occurred only occasionally. These long-lasting disruptions, combined with fears of
invasion, distorted the economy and increased the publics demand for gold.
[Figure 8: The Gold Reserve Ratio]
Secondly, rst three years of suspension led to some judicious farming of Cash and
reserves rose again to a more healthy level. The Bank even proposed a resumption of
Cash Payments when the ratio rose to over 30 percent in August 1798 and again to over
35 percent in February, but for political reasons63 the suspension was continued. The
third and the longest phase lasted from late 1799 to 1815, during which the cash ratio
drifted down as suspension was sustained. During this period the Bank used its discretion
to nance war and support commerce. Finally, with the war over, a volatile return to a
stable cash ratio was e¤ected.
Two points emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the suspension allowed the Bank to
operate without any explicit or implicit target for its cash reserve. The Bank was, in e¤ect,
optimising with respect to alternate uses of its assets by substituting loans for bullion.
Secondly, the Bank was able to economise on bullion as it was not strictly required to
meet liquidity needs from its liabilities.
We note that the run on the Banks reserves was not so much as a result of speculative
panic reecting the lack of credibility of the Bank itself, but rather a pre-emptive measure
by the country banks and individuals.64 The country bankers were rationally anticipating
bank runs and built their gold reserves in order to be well prepared to meet their customers
demand for specie. Demand for the Bank of England notes was large, because they were
convertible to gold on demand and not with the delay of country bank notes.
5 Managing Expectations
In this section we outline two models that help explain the circulation of Bank of England
notes. The rst is an exposition of Barros 1979 model of the gold standard in which
62The dotted line is calculated as the change in the gold price relative to the price level minus the rate
of return on Consols. We simply solve (11) for t using the data we have on the cash reserve ratio, the
gold and general price level and the consol rate.
63Cannan (1925), xviii.
64Fetter (1965) and Flandreau (2007).
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we show that a credible expectation of resumption of cash payments sets up ination
expectations that o¤set destabilising shocks arising from movements in prices, output
and the demand for non-monetary gold. In our second model we consider why notes
continued to circulate as working capital during the period of suspension and it appears
that some positive return compared to holding money as a Bank deposit. We note as well
that the Suspension did not change the Bank of Englands ratio of notes to deposits until
after 1815 and so there seems to have been some implicit target for the liabilities in the
main period of suspension.
5.1 Controlling the Price Level
Under a gold standard the supply of money is linked to the value of monetary gold and
the scale of backing. Money demand is related to the level of transactions and its own rate
of return, which is a negative function of the expected ination rate. As money was the
medium through which transactions were e¤ected, it was well understood that the money
market needed to clear. With transactions given, the crucial determinant of the clearing
in the money market is thus simply the value of gold and any expected depreciation in
the value of money. Even under a temporary suspension of convertibility, it could be
argued that the same principles apply, only that the central bank can decide over the
extent of gold backing, we explore this point explicitly in this section. We rst outline
what determines the price level under a standard when the value of gold impacts on the
money supply.
Let us rst solve for the price level under a gold standard. In Barro (1979) the following
relationships for gold demand for monetary and non-monetary purposes are posited:65
mst = p
a
t + a
G
t   t; (12)
where the money supply, mst , is a function of the price of gold, p
a
t , and the quantity of
monetary gold, AGt , and inversely related to the gold backing of money, t at time t.
Money demand, mdt , moves proportionally to the price level, pt, with income, yt, elasticity
 and falls at rate k in sustained ination expectations, et :
mdt = pt + yt   ket : (13)
By equating money demand and supply we note that the price level is thus given by the
value of monetary gold, pat + A
G
t , and terms in ination expectations, output and gold
backing:
pt = p
a
t + a
G
t + k
e
t   yt   t: (14)
Gold supply increases in proportion,  , to the relative price of gold:
ast =  (p
a
t   pt) : (15)
65In the original paper, implicit functions are used, we simply use a log linear specication.
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There is a target demand for non-monetary gold, ATn , which is proportional, , to the
inverse of the relative price of gold, depends negatively on sustained ination expectations
and positively on output:
ATn =  (pt   pat )  et + yt: (16)
The ow demand for non-monetary gold is thus error correcting with adjustment
parameter, , for the stock of non-monetary gold, Ant and also to replace depreciation,
GTn :
Ant = 
 
ATn   Ant

+ GTn (17)
We now solve for stability in the demand for monetary and non-monetary gold, see
Appendix A for the proof. Note that when the level of non-monetary gold demand is
above target, the directional force for _An is negative and when the level of monetary gold,
or by reection (11) the price level, is above target then the directional force for _Am is
also negative (Figure 9). The slope of _An = 0 in Am  An space is found by substituting
the steady-state equation for monetary gold, solved for the price level, into that for non-
monetary gold and then solving the locus for monetary gold for Am to give a slope of
1

:
An
tj _An=0 =
1

Ant +

  1


yt + +


  

et ; (18)
Note that the changes in y,  and et will shift the locus. Similarly we can substitute
out for pt in the same way for _Am = 0:
Am
tj _Am=0 =

 +  + 
Ant +
( + ) (  1) +  k
 +  + 
yt+t+
( + ) (   k)   k
 +  + 
et (19)
These two locii are drawn with lines of force in Figure 9. From inspection of the lines of
force, we note that two stable roots for the locii are guaranteed if the slope of 18 is greater
than that of 19. We choose the two shocks outlined to Figure 10 and 11 to understand
the policy problem at the point of the decision on whether to suspend convertibility:
bad harvests have reduced output and the gold backing of the currency is rapidly falling,
because of an internal and/or external drain moving us in Figure 10 to Point B and then
Point C in Figure 11. The economy will thus tend to su¤er an increase in the price
level but note that both of the stable arms have an argument in ination expectations
and so the original equilibrium, Point A, can be recovered if some mechanism can be
established to drive the price level back to where it was prior to the shocks, i.e. by
establishing sustained negative ination expectations. From the steady-states for price
level, monetary and non-monetary gold stocks, Appendix B, such expectations can reduce
the price level and increase the gold stocks. If on the other hand, positive inationary
expectations are formed then prices will continue to rise and the stock of monetary gold
to dwindle. The key policy response for a central bank under a gold standard, if it is to
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suspend convertibility or gold backing, is for that not to lead to persistent or sustained
expectations of higher prices as this will tend to lead to a collapse of the monetary
standard.
The mechanism by which dwindling gold reserves and increased note issuance could
also be associated with stable, or even negative, ination expectations combines two
clear policy strategies. First in the sense of Gorton (1988), by preventing the exchange
of notes for gold the Bank of England reserves stayed relatively buoyant, and so the
suspension of convertibility was perhaps a credible mechanism under which there was no
need for notes to be exchanged immediately, as they would hold their value in the future:
we explore this explanation in the next section. Secondly, to pass Acts of Parliament
that would help convince traders and merchants that suspension was indeed temporary.
Alongside the political debates leading to these Acts of Parliament, there seems to have
been considerable early consensual support for the Suspension with traders and merchants
and the Bank of England in favour. In either case, the key to maintaining some form of
stability was the maintenance of the belief that the price level would drift back to the
neighbourhood of its level prior to the suspension, which it did, of course.
5.2 Notes vs Other Stores of Value
Let us now turn to consider the holders of Bank of England liabilities that, for the time
being, we divide in notes and deposits. In the eighteenth century liabilities, either in
terms of Bank of England notes outstanding or deposits under the gold standard were
both payable in cash (gold) on demand and also exchangeable for each other. Each form
of liabilities were therefore close substitutes. The key di¤erence, though, is that Bank of
England notes were tradable in London and in the provinces they were used as a reserve
currency or in some districts, such as Lancashire, circulated widely, whereas the cashing
of deposits would require a trip to the Bank of England in London as it did not have any
branches until 1826. Notes were therefore part of the circulating medium for trade and
deposits operated more as a store of value.
Let us now modify the model of Freeman (1988) to consider the investors (agent)
problem and that of the Bank of England. Agents live for three periods and in every
period N agents are born with an endowment of %. At the end of period one, in which
they do not consume, they have to decide whether to hold their endowment either in terms
of deposits at the Bank which pays a gross interest rate of RD in cash (gold) every period
or in terms of notes, which are used to invest in capital which gives a nominal return in
period 3 of  in notes.66 Note deposits can be changed for gold in every period but notes
only after two periods in full and within one period at a discount. The rate of return on
capita, which we unusually equate to Bank of England notes, is typically greater than
that on deposits, which is simply the price of gold in terms of good and services: P
G
P
.
Even though notes are exchangeable for deposits they are typically tied up as working
capital and therefore cannot be traded at face value without paying a liquidation cost of
'. Agents do not initially know whether they will need the return in period 2 or period
66Clearly,  > 2 so that the consumer gets a premium for tying up his money for two periods. So
that   2is the liquidity premium.
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3 until the start of period 2 and therefore cannot individually decide whether to hold %
as a note or a deposit. So agents face the risk of (i) having their notes tied up as capital
in period 2 and having to liquidate with a penalty or (ii) having kept deposits for periods
2 and 3 and so loosing out on the excess return from having invested in capital. Table 3
shows the rates of return for notes and deposits in each of the two periods following the
rst:
Table 3: Subsequent Rates of Return
one period two period
Notes 
1
2   ' 
Deposits RD
 
RD
2
The two period rate of return on notes must be greater than the two period rate of
return on deposits, otherwise only deposits would be held. And the one period rate
of return on deposits must be greater than the one period rate of return on notes
RD > 
1
2   '

otherwise only notes would be held. So the relative rates of return
imply a preference for deposits for agents who will consume one period ahead and for
notes for those who will extract their return two periods ahead. The present value in
period one of notes is 
RD
and for deposits is simply RD. The Bank of England knows
the proportion of people with a demand for deposits (for example, without any loss of
generality, 1
2
) and can thus invest one-half of its endowment in two period assets
 
N%
2

,
for example, government or private securities, and one-half in liquid assets

RDN%
2

, i.e.
gold, in the same proportion and match its liability structure to that of its assets. Note
this equilibrium is stable because an agent who needs their return in the rst period will
not gain by delaying their return as they are mandated to spend in the rst period and a
later period agent will not gain by pretending to be an early period agent as they would
then lose the liquidity premium, as:

1
2   ' < 
RD
: (20)
With the fraction of agents in period one given, instability in note holding derives from
any incentive by late period agents to bring forward the liquidation of their notes i.e. to
increase velocity. And so any increase in the relative return on deposits (or reduction
in the cost of liquidation) compared to the return from capital could in principle bring
forward demand for deposits, or other assets, from note holders. In this case any possibility
that the gold price might rise in terms of the general price level in the rst period or,
indeed, any belief that notes would stop circulating would reduce their expected two
period rate of return, . The Bank of England will hold assets in proportion to the
known proportion of early and late period consumers e.g. 50% gold and 50% in securities.
But any unanticipated shock to the relative returns from holding deposits, the costs of
liquidation or the likelihood that notes will circulate in future may create a run on the
Bank of England, as there will be an incentive for late period investors to switch out
of notes, even accounting for the costs of capital liquidation. This run will increase the
probability of an increase in the rst period gold price or the cessation of note circulation
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and so bring forward even more late period agents. In the short run, the Bank will be
unable to use its note supply for payments.
In this scenario, notes will contract and deposits will be swapped for cash and bullion
at the bank will fall relative to securities. If on the other hand, any increase in the
rate of return on deposits, which is a function of the expected price of gold, is o¤set
by adopting a restriction of convertibility, then notes may continue to be held In other
words by exchanging the pay-o¤ from gold to the price level alone, RD  1
P
the run can
be prevented and notes continue to circulate as they return .
Proposition 2 A bank run can be avoided as long as 
1
2   ' < P:
Proof. From (20), and substituting RD  1
P
, shows that notes will be held if the nominal
rate of return on capital exceeds the liquidation returns from capital in the rst period.
If deposits and notes are not convertible into cash then, providing notes can be used
to circulate as working capital they will continue to be held as, in expectation, they o¤er
a greater rate of return than deposits and rst period liquidation. When we examine
the ratio of notes to deposits, Figure 12, we observe that the Bank of England seems to
have kept these in a proportion of around 2:1 prior to and for most of the suspension
and certainly until the end of the war. This means that velocity was of note circulation
was relatively stable over the suspension period and this reected the value of notes are
working capital, rather than simply nominal claims on expenditure.
6 Across the Channel: Assignats and Hard Franc
6.1 Financing the Revolution
The ruinous assignat period in France from 1790-1796 during the French Revolution
di¤ered from the Restriction Period in England in that Assignatsvalue was inclusively
backed by the sales of National Estates during the period when the principle bank of issue
in France, Caisse dEscompte, had suspended cash payments67. The government and the
National Assembly intended to issue Assignats and retire them by allowing holders to
purchase conscated church lands in auctions, and nally destroy returned Assignats.
The plan was not irrational, because conscated lands formed a capital asset that was
more than su¢ cient to cover the accumulated decits.68 Yet, French authorities failed
to organize land auctions e¢ ciently and Assignats, especially those with low face value,
remained in circulation.
As can be seen in Figure 13 the growth of Assignats was initially moderate, but
accelerated during the constitutional crisis in 1793 and after the declarations of war
with German Empire, Austria and Britain between 1792 and 1793. In January 1793
67The Caisse dEscompte suspended cash payments on 18 September 1789 as a result of a bank run.
White (1995)
68Hawtrey (1918). In 1789 the biens nationaux were worth some 3,500 millions of livres, while the
public expenditure was some 550 millions and the decit approxmately 162 millions.
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the assignat was worth 51 percent of its face value. During the Reign of Terror from
1793-1794 the Jacobin government imposed the laws on the Maximum which criminalised
private specie transactions, imposed wage and price controls and turned Assignats into a
guillotine-backed currency 69 These restrictions stabilized the value of Assignats despite
the continuous growth in the stock.
Once the Jacobin party was overthrown, controls weakened and in April 1795
the Directorate guaranteed the freedom of transaction in specie. After the repeal
both households and merchants were eager to change their accumulated Assignats to
commodities ooding the market and producing an abrupt depreciation, and, a year later,
suspension of issues from the land sales led to a rapid erosion of the value of Assignats.
The Directorate tried to withdraw some Assignats from circulation by accepting them at
one percent of their face value in payment of a forced loan.
[Figure 13: Assignats and their Depreciation ]
By late 1795 economy was in chaos. The government was unable to rise any tax revenue
and opportunities for public lending had long been vanished. Yet, the state still needed
to rise revenue, and as other means were not available, the Directorate issued Assignats.
After the hyperination and a brief unsuccessful attempt to replace the Assignats with
a new paper money, the Directorate demonetized all 44 billion Assignats on 4 February
1796, a year before the Bank of England suspended cash payments.
Were Assignats such folly that failure was inevitable? Many economic historians have
unreservedly dismissed the experiment.70 Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century, when
the agriculture was fundamentally the largest sector, mortgages and other land backed
securities in addition to land banks themselves were an integral part of the nancial
system. Many authorities and merchants considered land to be a superior reserve or
backing good to gold or silver. Land, wrote Daniel Defoe in 1697, is the best bottom
for public banks71. Idea of a land backed capital asset in the 1790s was not, therefore,
revolutionary.
Unlike the Ancien Régime, revolutionary governments and assemblies in principal
favoured a market economy even though they broke with their principles later on.
Assignats were, thus, a rather modern solution to the acute problem of budget decit.
Had the Ancién Régime found abundant lands in its possession, it had most likely
imposed forced sales to raise income. The Revolutionary government, on the other hand,
understood that the best value could not be received through forced sales especially when
nding suitable buyers was not straightforward in short period of time.
A fundamental di¤erence between the Assignats and the paper pound was that the
denite value of Assignats was unknown to its holder even though initially the value of
conscated lands exceeded the value of Assignats. The bearer of a paper pound note,
by contrast, knew that the Bank of England had promised to convert the note at xed
amount of gold in the future and this promise was not seriously challenged during the Bank
Restriction Period. In spite of uncertainties, at the outset the French nancial markets
69Sargent and Velde (1995).
70See detailied discussion in White (1995).
71Defoe (1697), Of the Multiplicity of Banks.
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seemed to have believed in Assignats: the yield of French consols fell from 7.5% in late
1789 to 5.3% in early 1790.72 In England the consol rate increased ahead of suspension,
but fell after the suspension had placated markets.
Whilst the value of paper pound remained relatively stable and notes did not fall
on discount, the value of assignat did not just fall but was very volatile. According to
Hawtrey (1918) by mid July in 1795 the Assignats were not longer a medium of exchange,
rather they had become an object of speculation. Speculators got much of the blame,
but together with those who accepted Assignats in hope for getting political favours, they
supported Assignatsvalue. Unlike England France did not have institutions or economic
systems such as parliament, public bank or free press that would have been able to tie the
hands of the future governments. As Hawtrey (1918) puts it, political leaders, especially
during the Revolution, are free to change their minds and nobody blames them much for
dropping a policy which they have striven in the past. Honouring the Assignats was one
of such policies.
6.2 Rebuilding Credibility of the Regime
Napoleon learned from both the Ancien Régimes and Revolutionary governments
mistakes and scal practices of the First Consul were initially sound and sustainable. The
Consulate accepted responsibility for the arrears of the Directorate in order to increase the
markets condence towards the new political system.73 By continuing the tax reforms
initiated by the Directorate, Napoleon was able to make payments on various public
debt instruments. He introduced new direct taxes, duties and sold successfully state
monopolies, and in a very short time the chronic budget decits of the past rulers were
eliminated. As a result of improved governance, the interest rate dropped below 10 percent
as can be seen from gure 14 making the existing debt cheaper to serve. Given the
size of his expenditure, Napoleons achievements on scal policy appeared as remarkable
as his military victories.
[Figure 14, Long-term interest rates]
Almost as soon as Napoleon came to power he introduced the rst rudimentary
banking reforms. The coup, which forced the Directorate out of power on 10 November
1799, was supported by a group of inuential French bankers. According to Crouzet
(1999) the group was probably promised a national bankbefore the take-over and was
certainly closely involved in its establishment.74 Concerned that the public would be slow
to subscribe the Banque de Frances initial capital of 30 million francs (30,000 shares, 1000
francs each), the bankers asked the state to support its establishment. Using the facade
of the Sinking Fund the state purchased 5000 shares and deposited 5 million francs on
the banks current account75. By contrast, the Bank of Englands capital of £ 1,2 million
had sold in London capital markets within 12 days in less time than could have been
72Bordo and White (1991).
73Bergeron (1981), p 41.
74Crouzet (1999), p 39.
75Crouzet (1999), p 40.
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imagined76 without the state having to subscribe initial capital and the Bank having
to recycle this back to the state.
On 16 February 1800 the Banque de France had its rst shareholdersmeeting. It was
decided that the General Council of the Banque de France, consisting of 15 regents, was
to be elected by the two hundred largest stockholders. The Council chose the governor
and deputy governors, set the discount rate and decided which bills were suitable for
discounting77. Like the Bank of England, the Banque de France had close relationship
with the large French banks and Parisian merchants after its establishment as both the
regents and governors came from this sector.
In spite of the governments involvement, the Banque de France was set up as a private
joint stock company and its management and organisation were at least partly divorced
from political circles aiming to provide a guarantee of the governments commitment
to sound economic policy. The Banque de France and the Sinking Fund became the
part of the new startof Napoleons regime that was targeted to satisfy the needs of
the merchant and banking community78, and in return, ensure that bankers supported
the state. Three years after its establishment the bimetallic standard and convertibility
of notes was rmly resumed. Partly to redene the banks relationship with the state
Napoleon granted the bank its rst o¢ cial charter in 1803 which gave it an exclusive
right to issue paper money in Paris for fteen years.79 At this time the government also
limited the maximum annual dividend of the Banque to six percent so that its shares
would not compete with government funds which paid 5 percent interest.80 If in England
the directors of the Bank used discretion over private discounts, their colleagues in France
only discounted carefully selected commercial paper. Until 1806 one third of the Banks
discount were advances to the government.81 As the smallest bank note had a face value
of 500 francs, they were never a medium of payment used by the general public.
According to Crouzet (1999) the main conicts between the government and the
central bank concerned the suitable level of interest and the extent of note issue. The
Banque de France was aware of problems over the channel and argued that higher rate of
interest and lower level of advances were crucial in maintaining the convertibility of franc.
Napoleon demanded the Banque de France to be more generous towards war contractors
forcing it, therefore, lend indirectly to the government.82
Involvement in failed indirect lending project and accommodation of doubtful bills
led to sharp increase of note circulation of the bank in 1806. A bank run broke out and
on 22 September 1805 the banks reserve was only 1.2 million francs. Rumors of the
Banks di¢ culties and false news of creation of new paper currency resulted of currency
problems: the bank notes depreciated 10 percent and the rate of exchange fell. To protect
its reserves the Banque de France was forced to suspend the bimetallic standard partially
and full suspension was avoided by rationing. The redemption of notes was limited to
76Clapham (1944), Vol I, p 19.
77Goodman (1992), p 41.
78Crouzet (1999), p 40.
79Crouzet (1999) p.42.
80Crouzet (1999), p 42.
81Bordo and White (1991).
82Crouzet (1999) p. 43.
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600,000 francs per day.
According to Crouzet (1999) Napoleon, who did not entirely comprehend the situation,
was furious and blamed the bank of these di¢ culties. Several o¢ cials had to give up their
positions and Napoleon implemented reforms that gave him more say in the management
of the Bank. In 1806 a new law gave the government the right to name the governor
and two deputy governors. The banks capital was doubled so that it could discount more
governments obligations. Napoleon claimed the Bank belongs more to the Emperor than
to the stockholders, because it creates money.83 On 12 February 1806 the Banque de
France was the rst central bank to adopt the Palmers rule: the bank declared that its
metallic reserves would always be at least one third of its note circulation.84
During the rst six years of Napoleons reign the scal system was adequate, but after
1806 decit grew steadily: if his campaigns of Ulm and Austerliz had cost 60 million francs
and the war in Spain about 70 million, the Russian campaign cost 700 million francs. The
expenditure in 1806 was 700 million and in 1812 and 1813 went over 1000 million francs.85
At the end of 1813 Napoleon had to cover his expenses by enormous increases in the direct
taxes. According to Bergeron (1981) it was not a negligible element in the rising political
crisis that led to the vote for his deposition.86
Napoleon was known to dislike public borrowing: he considered borrowing to be
undignied, because it would enforce the state under the powers of bankers and
merchants.87 Napoleon did modernise the scal practises by establishing the sinking
fund, but unlike in Britain, where the fund was employed to reduce the public debt,
Napoleons o¢ cials used it to support the rate of interest of public funds and providing
initial capital for the Banque de France.88 The market for government paper was strictly
controlled and only a small number of bankers and traders appointed by Napoleon, were
allowed to trade with obligations.
According to Crouzet (1999) Napoleon was painstakingly aware of dangers of ination
 its disastrous economic consequences and potential for causing social and political
disorder.89 Even at the end of 1812, when, using the language of Grossman and Van Huyck
(1988), default of strict monetary principle might have seen excusable, Napoleon covered
his enormous expenses by rising direct taxes rather than relying on paper nance or long
term borrowing.
The weakness of the scal system, according to White (1995), was that the Empire
depended on the continued extraction of foreign resources to support the military and the
Treasury. After the fatal Russian Campaign in 1813 the decit was 122 million francs.
By this point Napoleon gave in to Mollien, the a councillor of state (Chancellor of the
Exchequer) and proposed to issue bonds which were to be secured by the sale of village
commons. It is not surprising that these bonds did not sell out: by 1 April 1814 only 64
millions had been sold in spite of rumours circulated by the government agents that the
83Goodman (1992) p 41.
84Crouzet (1999), p 43, fn 24.
85Bergeron (1981), p 40.
86Bergeron (1981), p 41.
87Bergeron (1981), p 41 .
88Bergeron (1981), p 45.
89Crouzet (1999) p 45.
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common lands were selling rapidly.
The real problem that plagued French monetary and banking system was the lack of
reputation. The French banking system was so tarnished even before the Assignats that
when a group of protestant bankers established Caisse dEscompte, a limited joint-stock
company with government authorisation, in 1776, they avoided the word bank in its
name.90 The policy of the Banque de France was to maintain stability and security and
avoid extensive credit instead of supporting industry or searching prot opportunities for
its owners, something with which the Bank of England was closely engaged. The Banque
de France followed strict rules when it came to note issues and discounting. The monetary
system Napoleon established was rigid and almost entirely based on the circulation of
specie, and unlike in England, notes of the Banque de France were not substitutes to
specie. Dependency on specie made the system sensitive for supply shocks that were
political in nature: the main sources of specie were the invaded nations, especially Prussia,
which supported the circulation with 311 million in 1807, and 171 million in the next 23
months.91 Even in 1850 93% of all transactions in France were settled in specie compared
with 35% in England and 19% in Scotland.92 French banking system contributed to the
slowness of French industrialization and modernization during the nineteenth century 93
Specie was the most credible medium of payment and store of value in a society that was
prone to revolutions and in a monetary system that had lost its reputation.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have become used to a dichotomy of sorts between issues connected with the
microeconomics of rm protability and the macroeconomics of money, prices and interest
rates. The sense of this dichotomy can be questioned when the rm is itself a nascent
central bank. At this time the Bank of England provided the means of payment in London
and a settlement service for regional country banks. It also helped the government
by funding part of the war e¤ort directly and acted as an advisor in its dealings with
the London money markets. Since the inception of the Bank of England, the ongoing
convertibility of Bank of England notes into cash, was thought to be an integral part
of this function: would merchants or bankers hold liabilities that were not immediately
convertible into cash? This was the question for which the French state could not under
any circumstances construct a positive answer.
The Bank of Englands response and that of the political state was almost the converse
- that liabilities would not be held if convertibility was maintained. When faced with a
panic for conversion to cash, which could not be satised at face value given a high multiple
of liabilities to cash, the monetary authorities responded by suspending convertibility and
taking a sequence of steps that acted to ensure the future value of Bank of England notes
in terms of gold. By ensuring the future value, there was no clear advantage to seeking
cash and the advantage of the liquidity arising from holding notes was maintained. As
90Crouzet (1999) p 27.
91Bergeron (1981), p. 43.
92Crouzet (1999), p 47.
93Crouzet (1999), p 48.
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long as the Bank of England remained solvent, then it seemed likely that notes would
eventually have their gold value re-instated.
At a stroke, this acted to stop the panic. It also handed the Bank of England the
opportunity to lend extensively with limited cash reserves and increase its gearing, safe in
the knowledge that its liabilities were not especially short term, as the Acts of Parliament
has guaranteed that their maturity would now coincide with the duration of the war, and
not with the whims of invasion rumour. Naturally, lending was still subject to careful
scrutiny94, as under the usury laws it would have been very easy to create problematic
assets. The Bank of England was, in e¤ect, given the freedom to optimise over its balance
sheet, with the constraint of immediate payment in cash removed. This degree of freedom
could not be a¤orded by Napoleon to the Banque de France and so Midas could not in
either country transmute all into paper.
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Appendix B
Deriving the price stability conditions
The change in the stock of non-monetary gold, _An, thus is the sum of demand, ant ,
less depreciation, Gnt :
_An = ant   Gnt = ( + )
 
ATn   Ant

(A1)
The change in monetary gold is the di¤erence between supply, as, and demand, ant ,
for non-monetary gold:
_Am = as   ant =  (pat   pt)  
 
ATn   Ant
  ATn (A2)
The steady-state of the model requires no change in prices or gold ows:
_p = _An = _Am = 0;
at this point the change in demand for monetary and non-monetary gold are both 0
and so the net supply of gold will equal the depreciation rate on the non-monetary gold
stock. Into which we place 15 and 16:
ant   Ant = as   ant = 0) as = Ant
 (pat   pt) = ATn
 (pat   pt ) = [ (pt   pat )  et + yt ];
to give the steady-state price level:
p = pa +

 + 
(e   y) : (A3)
The steady state demand for non-monetary and monetary gold are given by the
following equations:
An =  (p   pa)  e + y  = ATn ; (A4)
Am = p + y +    ke   pa: (A5)
The total demand for gold is thus:
An + Am = (1 + ) (p   pa)  (k + ) e + (1 + ) y + :
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And the dynamics are thus given by:
_An = 0 = ( + )
 
ATn   Ant

(A6)
_Am = 0 =  (pat   pt)  
 
ATn   Ant
  ATn : (A7)
Note that when the level of non-monetary gold demand is above target, the directional
force for _An is negative and when the level of monetary gold, or by reection (11) the
price level, is above target then the directional force for _Am is also negative (Figure 1).
The slope of _An = 0 in Am An space is found by substituting the steady-state equation
for monetary gold, solved for the price level, into that for non-monetary gold and then
solving the locus for monetary gold for Am to give a slope of 1

:
An
tj _An=0 =
1

Ant +

  1


yt + +


  

et ; ( _G
n = 0)
Note that the changes in y,  and et will shift the locus. Similarly we can substitute
out for pt in the same way for _Am = 0:
Am
tj _Am=0 =

 +  + 
Ant +
( + ) (  1) +  k
 +  + 
yt + t +
( + ) (   k)   k
 +  + 
et
( _Gm = 0)
These two locii are drawn with lines of force in Figure 1. From inspection of the lines
of force, we note that two stable roots for the locii are guaranteed if the slope of 18 is
great than that of 19.
Result 1: Stability is ensured if mAn
tj _An=0 > mA
m
tj _Am=0. And is given by  +  > 0,
which is satised for all positive parameters.
Condition 3 Proof. 1

> 
+ +
!  +  +  >  !  +  > 0:
Result 2: For unit elasticity of price with respect to output, , and for the target
demand for non-monetary gold, , locus (14) is invariant to output, yt but locus (15)
remains positive:  k
+ +
:
Result 3: Changes in the gold backing of the note issue unambiguously shift both
locii in the direction of the change.
Result 4: The direction of the response of the locii to changes in sustained ination
expectations, et , depends on the responsiveness of the price level to changes in ination
expectations, k. For su¢ ciently low k the locii will respond in the same direction as the
change in ination expectations.
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Proof. From (14) 

>  and from (15) (+)
(+)+ 
> k:
Result 5: Let there be a negative shock to the output and also a reduction in the
gold backing of the paper issue. Figure 10 shows the impact of a negative shock to output.
It leads to a fall in both non-monetary and monetary gold stocks, and an increase in the
price level. For Figure 11, let us now add a reduction in the gold backing of the note
issue, a fall in , which leads to a rightward move in both locii. Assuming a once-for-all
shock in both cases, the price level is higher (P    P ) and total stock of both monetary
and non-monetary gold is lower.
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Figure 1: The Bullion Reserve of the Bank of England, monthly, in thousands of £s, 
Gayer et al. (1953) table 153. 
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Figure 2: Credit Pyramid in the Eighteenth Century 
Figure 3: The Bank of England liabilities, in millions of £s, Gayer et al. (1953) tables 
138 and 144, and Shea (2007). 
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Figure 4: The Bank of England's Notes in Circulation from 10 June 1976-18 
March 1797, weekly, in thousands of £s. Recorded at the Appendix of the Third 
Report of the Committee on Secrecy, 1797.  
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Figure 5: Nominal Variables during the Suspension, annually. Sources: Gayer, 
et al. (1957) and Officer, L.H . (2006) `The Price of Gold, 1257-2005' 
MeasuringWorth.com. 
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Figure 6: Short and long-term interest rates, Gayer et al. (1953) and Heim and 
Mirowski (1987). 
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
1780 1785 1790 1795 1800 1805 1810 1815 1820 1825
%
Long-term Interest Rate: Nominal Consol Yield
Short-term Interest Rate: Nominal East Indian Bond Yield
Usury rate
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1794 1796 1798 1800 1802 1804 1806 1808 1810 1812 1814 1816 1818 1820 1822 1824
Figure 7: Ratio of the Bank's unfunded debt holdings to the total unfunded debt, 
Gayer et al. (1953), tables 157 and 231. 
Figure 8: Ratio of the Bank's unfunded debt holdings to the total unfunded debt, 
Gayer et al. (1953), tables 157 and 231. 
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Figure 11: Bad Harvests and Reduction of Gold Backing. 
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Figure 12: Ratio of Notes to Deposits at the Bank of England 
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Figure 13: Circulation (right axis) and depreciation (left axis) of assignats 
Aubin (2008) Tables A1 and A2. 
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Figure 14: Long-term Interest Rate in France and England, annually. 
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